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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, Spanish policy on controlling migratory flows has broadened 
in scope and perfected its actions, placed greater emphasis on border control without 
relaxing internal control, incorporated a growing number of actors from the national, 
international, state and private sectors and improved its mechanisms of ‘remote control’. 
Externalisation, deterritorialisation, bilateralism and cooperation have characterised 
Spanish intervention through sometimes difficult joint management with different states 
and levels of government based on the principle of co-responsibility. Moreover, from 
2006 Spain has become an influential actor in European border policy by creating 
initiatives focused on cooperating with countries of origin and transit, becoming 
involved in the development of EU initiatives and promoting the idea that border 
control is a ‘joint issue’. 
The fights against irregular immigration and human trafficking networks have become 
priorities for Spain due to its geographic location and also because of the huge increase 
in migratory flows by sea that occurred in the middle of this decade, both of which are 
characteristics particular to irregular immigration to Southern European countries, in 
contrast to the type of immigration that has arrived at traditional receiving countries in 
other European regions. In response, Spain has improved its border actions by 
increasing human resources, the use of surveillance technology and the amount of 
resources dedicated to containing flows at their points of origin. It has also started 
signing readmission agreements and intercepting migrants in transit territories and on 
the high seas through bilateral and multilateral actions. Although over the past few 
years this area of policy has become less reactive and more complex and improved, 
there has been a certain amount of continuity in its development and objectives ever 
since the beginning of the 1990s. Recently, controlling migratory flows has also become 
a much more important issue in Spanish foreign policy and security. 
At the same time, border management has given rise to very difficult political, social 
and ethical dilemmas due to the confluence of interests of different actors, the 
distribution of competences between different levels of government, the uneven 
effectiveness of the actions that have been taken and the tension between different 
understandings, principles and objectives that may affect, above all, its legitimacy. 
4 
 
Intervention in this area is at the root of most of the problems surrounding the 
governability of migration and the social response that it has provoked, transforming it 
into a volatile policy area which is constantly being re-evaluated.  
 
2. Becoming an immigration country. The rapid and intense Spanish migratory 
transition 
As has been the case of other Southern European countries, in the 1980s Spain became 
a destination for immigration for the first time in its history. Spain’s migratory 
transition has been one of the quickest and most intense among the new European 
receiving countries. In the middle of the 1980s, when it created its first immigration 
law, the number of foreign residents in Spain barely surpassed a quarter of a million and 
was mainly composed of pensioners from other European countries. According to the 
latest official data published by the National Statistics Institute
 1
 (INE) foreign residents 
in Spain at the beginning of 2009 was greater than 5.5 million, accounting for 12% of 
the total population. The largest communities among foreign residents in Spain are
2
 
Romanian, Moroccan, Ecuadorian, Columbian and British (see Figure 3). Other data 
illustrate the huge demographic and social effect of this change in migratory dynamics: 
currently 10% of workers paying into the social security system are foreigners; close to 
750,000 foreign students study in Spanish schools; from 2001 to 2008 more than 
360,000 foreigners have acquired Spanish nationality; and 20.7% of all babies born in 
Spain have foreign mothers.  
Migration has been particularly intense since 1999. At the end of the 1990s, there were 
less than 750,000 foreign residents in Spain, representing only 1.86% of the population; 
much lower than the current 12% (see Figure 1). The rate of growth was particularly 
strong in 2000 and 2003 and again in 2005 and 2006. In some cases the inter-annual 
variations were greater than 48.36% (see Figure 2). This is why an article published by 
Joaquín Arango in the middle of this decade indicated that Europe’s growth as a 
                                                            
1 According to data from the Padrón Municipal de Habitantes [‘these are administrative registers in 
which the inhabitants of each municipality are recorded. The respective town councils are responsible for 
creating, maintaining, revising and storing it. It is updated from the revision of the municipal register 
referring to 1 January of each year’ (INE)]. 
2 According to the most recent data provided by the Secretaría de Estado de Inmigración y Emigración 
(an office of the Spanish Ministry of Work and Immigration) , from September 2009, which uses 
residence cards as the source, the largest group of foreign residents are from Morocco (758,174), which is 
slightly higher than the number of Romanians (728,580).  
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receiving region was due in large part to the intense migratory flows directed at Spain 
and Italy (Arango 2006). We should not forget that during the last decade a third of the 
new migratory flows toward Europe were directed toward Spain, which became the 
OECD country which received the second highest number of immigrants in absolute 
terms, after the United States, and the highest, in relative terms.  
 
Figure 1. Foreign population in Spain (1999-2009) 
  
Total 
 
% 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009*  
 
748,954 
923,879 
1,370,657 
1,977,946 
2,664,168 
3,034,326 
3,730,610 
4,144,166 
4,519,554 
5,268,762 
5,598,691 
 
1.86 
2.28 
3.33 
4.73 
6.24 
7.02 
8.46 
9.27 
10.00 
11.41 
12.00 
   
Source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes. Foreign Population (thousands). The National Statistics 
Institute (INE) 
*Provisional data 
 
 
Figure 2. Inflow of foreign population in Spain (1999-2008) 
  
Total 
 
Male 
 
Female 
 
Male (%) 
 
Female (%) 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
 
92,122 
330,881 
394,048 
443,085 
429,524 
645,844 
682,711 
802,971 
920,534 
692,228 
 
50,038 
178,006 
210,580 
232,699 
223,036 
354,722 
370,562 
422,997 
502,168 
370,432 
 
49,084 
152,875 
183,468 
210,386 
206,488 
291,122 
312,149 
379,974 
418,366 
321,796 
 
54.31 
53.79 
53.44 
52.51 
51.92 
54.92 
54.27 
52.67 
54.55 
53.51 
 
 
45.68 
46.20 
46.55 
47.48 
48.07 
45.07 
45.72 
47.32 
45.44 
46.48 
Source: Residence Variation Statistic. The National Statistics Institute (INE) 
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Figure 3 Foreign population in Spain by nationality (2009*) 
 
Nationality 
 
Total 
 
% 
Romania 
Morocco 
Ecuador 
United Kingdom 
Colombia 
Bolivia 
Germany 
Italy 
Bulgaria 
China 
Argentina 
Portugal 
Peru 
Brazil 
France 
Dominican Republic 
Poland 
Ukraine 
Paraguay 
Venezuela 
796,576 
710,401 
413,715 
374,600 
292,971 
227,145 
190,584 
174,912 
164,353 
145,425 
140,443 
140,424 
137,154 
124,737 
120,246 
86,888 
84,823 
81,132 
80,467 
60,751 
14.2 
12.7 
7.4 
6.7 
5.2 
4.1 
3.4 
3.1 
2.9 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
2.4 
2.2 
2.1 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.1 
 
Total 
 
5,598,691 
 
100 
Source: Padrón Municipal de Habitantes. Foreign Population (thousands). The National Statistics 
Institute (INE) 
*Provisional data 
 
Although the factors that explain the activation and persistence of migratory flows are 
extremely complex, the intensity of this immigration can be partially explained as a 
result of Spain’s economic growth over the last decade –which was the highest among 
the countries of Europe of the fifteen– and of the demand of its restructured labour 
market during a period of intense job creation. However, the development of the 
Spanish economy has largely depended on the services sector, hotels, tourism and 
construction. Dependence on these sectors has made the economy structurally weak 
and, over the years, it has created a growing gap in productivity when compared to the 
rest of the European economy (FEDEA 2009). This economic situation has led directly 
to an increase in the demand for unskilled workers in those sectors and others, such as 
agriculture, which offers seasonal employment, and domestic services, the demand for 
which has grown as a consequence of the increased level of education of Spanish 
women and their massive incorporation into the labour market, as well as the aging of 
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the population and the fact that the Spanish Baby Boom generation has arrived at their 
reproductive cycle. 
Some experts have concluded that, in addition to economic growth, the intense 
migratory flows to Spain throughout the last decade were also caused by the demand of 
the labour market, its segmentation and low levels of regulation, the attraction of the 
informal economy and the higher standards of Spanish workers when deciding which 
jobs were ‘acceptable’ to them, a tendency related to the growing social and economic 
prospects of the country (Baldwin-Edwards and Arango, 1999; Cachón, 2002). 
The Spanish migratory model can be characterised by other aspects as well. First of all, 
as is the case with other Southern countries, it is generally composed of immigrants 
seeking work. The labour model of Southern Europe, as opposed to migratory model of 
relatives and refugees in the traditional receiving countries, explains in part the current 
composition of the flows and the heavy presence of immigrant workers in the national 
labour markets. As the Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS)
3
 shows, 
immigrants represent a large part of the active population. In addition, in contrast to 
what occurs in the majority of Northern European countries, immigrants have higher 
activity rates that the native population, a statistic indicative of the early stages of 
immigration history. In the middle of the 1990s, the non-EU active population in Spain 
barely passed 100,000 people, 0.7% of the active population. These data contrast with 
those available in the middle of the current decade: almost 2 million non-EU foreigners 
are included in the active population, representing 9.3% of the workers in Spain. In 
2005, immigrants had a global activity rate of 79% which was almost 24 points higher 
than that of the Spanish, which was 55%. This disparity in activity was not a random 
occurrence in the middle of the decade, but rather a persistent tendency, although 
variable over time. This persistence is clearly seen in the EAPS carried out from 1996 to 
the present. However, it should be noted that the younger average age of the foreigners 
largely explains this difference.  
                                                            
3 The Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) [Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS)] is a survey 
that has been carried out every trimester since 1964 by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National 
Statistics Institute, a government institution which collects and distributes official statistics about Spain]. 
Its goal is to obtain information about the working population and its different labor categories, as well as 
about the inactive population. The advantage that this survey has over other sources is that it collects 
information about national and foreign workers in the formal economy as well as in the informal 
economy. It is the best source of information to understand the Spanish labor market and the employment 
of foreign immigrants 
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The latest data provided by the EAPS, from September 2009, indicate that the number 
of foreign workers who are economically active is now greater than 3.5 million 
(3,658,800). However, the economic crisis has had devastating consequences for the 
employment rates of immigrant workers. Unemployment for this group has shot up to 
28%, almost 12 points higher than that of the native workforce.  
The demand of the labour market also explains the strong presence of female 
immigrants, with women representing just under half of the arriving flows (see Figure 
2), as well as the heavy concentration of immigrants in residential areas in the 
wealthiest regions where there is greatest demand for foreign workers, such as Madrid, 
Catalonia, the Valencian Community, Murcia, Andalusia, Balearic Islands and the 
Canary Islands.  
However, it should be pointed out that for years migrants have joined the Spanish 
labour market, particularly in the least skilled jobs in construction, hotel services, 
agriculture and domestic services, with very little state intervention. Until recently, 
market forces were the main source of internal regulation of foreign workers in the 
Spanish economy. 
Other well known aspects of Spain’s migration experience are the high number of 
irregular immigrants among foreign residents and the frequency in which most 
immigrants spend at least some time in an irregular legal and social status during their 
migratory experience. One of the most common pathways to irregularity is known as 
‘befallen’ irregularity (Izquierdo 2006). As we shall see, the lack of recruiting 
mechanisms and regulation of flows from abroad, the weakness of the migration control 
procedures in place in the 1990s and the specific needs of the economic sectors 
mentioned earlier allowed immigrants to enter Spain ‘through the back door’, find work 
in the informal economy and later receive legal status through documentation programs. 
In this sense, for nearly two decades Spanish policy on the regulation of migratory 
flows was complex, reactive and ambivalent. The difficulties involved in accessing the 
Spanish labour market legally, despite demand and the creation of a quota policy, forced 
many migrants to enter Spain with tourist visas through air and land borders, under the 
indifferent watch, and at times complicity, of the state. That is why the majority of 
citizens of the largest immigrant communities in Spain, the Moroccans, Ecuadorians 
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and Columbians during the 1990s, and more recently the Bolivians, entered Spain as 
tourists.   
Figure 4. Regularisation processes in Spain and number of positive resolutions  
(1986-2005) 
 
Year 
 
Positive resolutions 
 
% of total foreign 
population 
1986 38,181 0.7 
1991-1992 109,135 0.9 
1996  21,283 1.3 
2000 169,157 2.2 
2001 (only for Ecuadorians) 20,352 
2001 (re-examination) 36,013 
2001 (arraigo*) 232,679 
2005 577,923 7.8 
Source: Report prepared by the Gabinete de Presidencia de La Moncloa in Izquierdo, A and Fernández , 
B (2009). 
*A special amnesty that was carried out in 2001 in which people in an irregular situation could receive 
documentation if they could show that they had developed strong ties to Spanish society (such as having a 
child born in Spain, having a job or a job offer, etc.). 
 
Therefore, the irregular status that has formed part of the migratory experience of the 
majority of the foreign residents in Spain did not a result from clandestine entry into the 
territory, but rather from staying in the country after their tourist visas had expired, a 
situation often referred to as ‘overstaying’. Regularisation processes have been used 
repeatedly by the Spanish government and immigrants to obtain regular status. As is 
well known, since 1985 Spain has carried out eight regularisations, if we include the 
review and renewal processes of 2001 which documented more than 1 million foreign 
workers (see Figure 4). In addition, between 1993 and 2003, the quota system, which 
contracted foreigner workers in their countries of origin, was basically a concealed 
annual regularisation that allowed irregular immigrants residing in Spain to be 
contracted. Along with the regularisations, this system allowed many immigrants to 
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obtain regular status in Spain and later stabilise their situations. Therefore, for more 
than a decade the model of immigration which existed in Spain (Izquierdo, 2001) did 
not see immigrants trapped in an irregular status, but rather passing through it as a first 
stage of settling, despite the fact that the percentage of irregulars among the total 
migrant population had reached very high levels (Izquierdo, 2006). The regularisations 
have provided the majority of migrants what we can call a soft transition to the 
condition of regular immigrant, a status which according to Spanish legislation provides 
them with full social and economic rights.  
 
3. Creating Spanish policy on controlling migratory flows: legal and policy aspects 
From the beginning of the 1990s, Spanish policy on controlling migratory flows has 
been marked by a tension between a growing demand for workers in the national labour 
market and Spain’s condition as the southern border of Europe. Paradoxically, the 
debate surrounding the enactment of the first immigration law in Spain in the middle of 
the 1980s presented migratory regulation and control of migratory flows as questions of 
security and public order, despite the small number of immigrants at the time and the 
absence of social and political concern for this emerging phenomenon. The debates 
surrounding the law which was enacted in the summer of 1985 with a broad consensus 
and little participation of social actors, linked immigration with organized crime and 
terrorism and emphasised the lack of effective mechanisms to expulse irregular 
immigrants. However, this legislation was not accompanied by other means or the 
human and technical resources required to effectively control the Spanish borders. 
Beyond the weaknesses of this first law, it was the lack of means and the weak actions 
carried out which lead us to conclude that controlling flows was not a priority in the 
Spanish agenda until the 1990s and also that Spain’s borders were permeable during this 
period.  
However, the majority of the proposals included in the 1991 proposición no de ley
4
 
were focused precisely on developing the internal and border control aspects of this 
policy; among them, modernizing the facilities, streamlining expulsion procedures, 
                                                            
4 A motion to open a parliamentary debate meant to raise awareness about an issue or to petition the 
government to take action on something 
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developing a visa policy, documenting irregular immigrants and controlling the internal 
labour market. During the 1990s migratory regulation was fundamentally reactive.  
Internally, the needs of the labour market produced mostly ambivalent and at times 
erratic policies. For years the actual permeability of the border grew further away from 
the formal permeability (Godenau, 2009) which was included as an objective in political 
documents. Therefore, despite the explicit discourse on creating a restrictive 
immigration policy, imbued with agreements on the European level and the mood of 
public opinion, in practice Spanish policy in this area allowed the labour market’s 
demand for foreign workers to be met (Aparicio and Roig, 2006) through amnesties, the 
annual hidden regularisation of the quota system and lax border control.  
The short-term visa policy also appeared in the public discourse as a key piece of the 
regulation; a policy that meant that Spain stopped suppressing visas as had been the 
norm during Franco’s dictatorship, especially with Latin American countries. Before 
this requisite was implemented for citizens of certain countries, according to Spanish 
legislation entry could only be denied if a traveller did not have sufficient funds, lacked 
a return ticket or for reasons related to national security or public health. Spanish visa 
policy, which had also been heavily influenced by decisions adopted by the European 
Union
5
, was implemented at the beginning of the 1990s when this requisite was 
progressively broadened to include Peruvians, Moroccans and Dominicans (the most 
numerous flows during the first half of the 1990s) and, more recently, Columbians, 
Ecuadorians and Bolivians (the largest immigrants groups of this decade, along with the 
Romanians). However, in practice this policy has been difficult to apply because the 
network of Spanish consulates lacked the human and material resources needed to meet 
this enormous administrative burden that this deterritorialization of control entailed, 
effectively transforming consulates into the primary filters to entry (Moya, 2006). Two 
mechanisms have been vital to improving effectiveness in this area: consular reform in 
countries of origin and coordination between embassies, other areas of Spanish 
administration and the governments of the countries of origin. These difficulties have 
caused the visa policy to be reactive, allowing the discretional recourse of employing 
exemptions to meet specific needs (Izquierdo, 1996). Therefore, throughout the majority 
                                                            
5 The EU created a list of third countries which must apply for visas in order to enter the European Union. 
This list has been evolving due to the enactment of several regulations (Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 
Regulation (EC) No 453/2003; Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006). 
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of the 1990s, Spanish immigration policy was characterised by weak border control and 
weak control in remote countries, along with reactive internal control measures in which 
regularisations were the most notable actions carried out by the government. In the 
current decade ‘remote control’ has been employed reactively; for instance, the visa 
requisite was applied to Columbians, Ecuadorians and Bolivians when the arrival flows 
reached high levels, although many tourist visas were simply given, no questions asked.  
Both the fact that Spain is Europe’s southern border and its proximity to Africa have 
had a great deal of influence on the evolution of how its controlled migration since the 
middle of the 1990s. Among the objectives of this political action have been the 
progressive shielding of Spanish maritime borders, particularly the Strait of Gibraltar, 
and the perimeters surrounding the cities of Ceuta and Melilla, the territories that are 
most easily accessed from and closest to Africa. The actions taken in the second half of 
the 1990s illustrate that controlling irregular immigration by sea had become a greater 
priority in the political agenda. Although this type of migration is much less numerous, 
it is also far more visible; and above all, it has a stronger impact on Spanish public 
opinion and on the leaders of other countries in the European Union. Spanish 
immigration policy in the second half of the 1990s had already begun to show signs of 
transforming the borders into selective political mechanisms, or in mechanisms of 
selective permeability for certain migratory flows, which allowed for differentiated 
actions in ‘hard borders’ and ‘soft borders’. 
At the beginning of the 1990s surveillance began to be improved around the border 
perimeters of Ceuta and Melilla, the two autonomous Spanish cities located in Africa. 
The construction of border fences began in Ceuta in 1993 and in Melilla in 1996. From 
that moment on security around these perimeters has been increasing, not only by 
constructing very tall fences, but also by installing infra-red cameras, motion detectors 
and control towers. Finally, in 1998, the Plan Sur was implemented, a programme 
designed to improve surveillance of land, air and ports.  
From the middle of the 1990s, problems in managing the flows to these two 
autonomous cities began to arise which would be repeated a decade later in the 
Canaries. Not only was there an increase in the number of sub-Saharan Africans living 
on the outskirts of the cities in settlements under inhuman conditions, but the refusal of 
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the Moroccan authorities to accept their readmission and the practical impossibility of 
carrying out repatriations led to repeated cases of severe overcrowding in holding 
centres. To alleviate these situations, the Spanish authorities repeatedly sent immigrants 
to other Spanish provinces, although this was always considered to be an exceptional 
measure. As Pablo Pumares indicated at the end of the 1990s, the success of measures 
used to control the flows turns against these kinds of enclaves, territories that are 
already very constrained and with limited resources (Pumares, 1998, 2002). 
The flow across the Strait of Gibraltar has not been studied in depth despite the 
coverage it has received in the media and the impact it has had on public opinion. A 
mere 14 km separate the Spanish coast from Africa, but the strong currents in the 
straight and the conditions in which the crossing is carried out in order to evade 
detection creates an extremely dangerous situation. At the end of the 1980s the first 
migrants crossing the straight began arriving on the coasts of Cadiz in Andalusia, at a 
time when immigration was not a priority in Spanish politics. The majority of 
immigrants launched their vessels from beaches located between Tangiers and Ceuta, 
and much less often near Melilla. Initially the routes crossed the straight to Cadiz, the 
province closest to Moroccan soil, where long, sandy beaches made it easy to land. This 
flow was made up mostly of young male migrants from urban and rural areas of 
Northern Morocco (El Rif and the Northern provinces that once formed part of the 
Spanish protectorate) and from Eastern Morocco. However, in the second half of the 
1990s this route, known as the Western Mediterranean Route, began to be used by 
migrants from sub-Saharan countries, such as Senegal or Nigeria.  
Externalising actions to third countries soon became a tactic used to achieve policy 
objectives. A readmission agreement was signed in 1992 with Morocco
6
 through 
bilateral negotiations, although for years the agreement produced little results. The 
unequal relationship between the governments of the two countries, especially during 
the administrations of the Partido Popular (1996-2000 and 2000-2004), often led to 
political tension which undermined the intention of the agreement, which was to convert 
Morocco in an essential actor involved in controlling the Spanish borders. Between 
                                                            
6 Agreement of 13 February, between the Kingdom of Spain and the Kingdom of Morocco regarding the 
movement of people, transit and the readmission of foreigners who enter illegally (B.O.E nº 100 de 
25/4/1992). 
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1998 and 2003 the tensions ran so high that not a single readmission was carried out by 
the Moroccan authorities, despite petitions made by Spain.  
If we take into consideration the total number of irregular immigrants that were found to 
be in Spanish territory during the regularisation processes carried out in Spain, in reality 
only a very small percentage of irregular immigrants were expulsed from the country in 
the 1990s, although after 1993 an increasing number of Moroccans were denied entry 
and there were more than 8,000 annual ‘returns’ in the second half of the 1990s7.  
 
4. The push toward greater regulation and control of flows and increased border 
surveillance between 2000 and 2005 
At the beginning of this decade, with the Partido Popular (PP) governing Spain, the 
GRECO Plan became the main instrument employed to analyse the objectives of 
Spanish policy. Among those objectives were to sign agreements to organise migrations 
from the countries of origin, to increase border control and fight against irregular 
immigration.  
In 2001, the first agreements to contract workers in their countries of origin were 
signed, following procedures described in the plan. These agreements tried to put into 
practice an orderly regulation of migrations which would meet both the needs of the 
labour market and the objectives of migratory policy. The idea was to create ways of 
selecting and channelling foreign workers by determining their profiles, their country of 
origin, where they would be placed in the labour market and also within Spanish 
territory. 
These agreements sought to deepen relations with countries that had already been 
sources of migration and with which immigration already formed part of bilateral 
relations (Columbia, Ecuador, Morocco and the Dominican Republic). They also served 
to establish new relations with other countries which around that time had become some 
                                                            
7 There are various figures or modalities listed in the Immigration Law: a) the return of people rejected at 
authorised border checkpoints, usually airports or ports, b) removal or expulsion (people who are 
repatriated in accordance with one of the reasons listed in the law, usually administrative procedures 
derived from an illegal stay in Spain, c) the return of people who try to enter Spain through other border 
areas and d) readmissions (expulsions from Spain using readmission agreements with third countries).  
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of the largest sources of migration to Spain (Bulgaria, Poland and Romania) (Ferrero 
and López-Sala, 2009).  
A. Irregular immigration and routes 
 
The move toward contracting workers in their home countries –which had more or less 
effective results over the following years, but which was a turning point in the way that 
foreign workers were recruited –was coupled with a decisive move toward controlling 
Spain’s maritime borders, with priority given to the Strait of Gibraltar and the Canary 
Islands, the two points of entry for irregulars which were most accessible by sea. It 
should be noted that the maritime borders of the EU are nearly 80,000 km long, and 
nearly half of this (34,109 km) is the Southern maritime border. Spain, Italy and Greece 
have the most extensive and accessible maritime borders in Southern Europe and, along 
with Malta, are the main points of destination of irregular immigration routes in the 
Mediterranean (see Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Irregular Mediterranean and African migration routes 
 
SPAIN:  
West Mediterranean Route and West African Route 
Entry or destination points: Ceuta and Melilla, Strait of Gibraltar (Andalusian provinces, Murcia) and the 
Canary Islands.  
From Morocco and other African countries (Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Ivory Coast) 
Transit countries: Mauritania and Morocco. 
 
 
MALTA:  
East African Route 
From Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Congo 
Transit countries: Tunisia and Libya 
 
 
ITALY 
East African Route 
Entry and destination points: Sicily, The Pelagic islands (the southernmost part of Italy) 
From Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Congo 
Transit countries: Tunisia and Libya 
 
 
GREECE 
The East Mediterranean route targets primarily Greece, making use of Turkey and the Middle Eastern 
countries as transit countries 
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B. The Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE) 
 
At the end of the 1990s, irregular immigration arriving in Spain by sea skyrocketed (see 
Figure 6A and 6B). The continued arrival of small vessels crossing the Straight of 
Gibraltar made maritime surveillance one of the Spanish government’s priorities. In 
response, the government began to implement an Integrated External Vigilance System 
(SIVE) in 2001 (see Figure 7). SIVE is a high tech electronic surveillance and 
interception system that the Spanish Civil Guard uses to monitor the Spanish coast. It 
was originally implemented in the Strait of Gibraltar and in 2001 along the Andalusian 
coast, in the province of Cadiz; it has also been gradually implemented in other areas of 
Andalusia, the Mediterranean coast and the coasts of the Canaries. This system 
combines three elements: a) radar stations distributed along the coast, b) control centres 
where specialised agents can control the movement of the cameras and radars scattered 
along the coast and c) ‘interception units’ (patrol boats, helicopters and vehicles) that 
receive orders from the control centre. The budget to put this system in operation on 
Spanish coasts between 2001 and 2006 was 106 million euros, while in 2005 and 2008 
its total cost was 130 million euros.  
 
Figure 6. A. Irregular immigrants arriving in Spain in small boats (pateras and 
cayucos (1999-2008) 
  
Strait of Gibraltar 
 
 
Canary Islands 
 
Total* 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
 
 
2,694 
12,785 
14,405 
6,795 
9,788 
7,245 
7,066 
7,502 
5,579 
4,243 
 
875 
2,410 
4,112 
9,875 
9,388 
8,426 
4,715 
31,678 
12,478 
9,181 
 
 
3,569 
15,195 
18,517 
16,670 
19,176 
15,675* 
11,781 
39,180 
18,057 
13,424 
 
Source: Spanish Civil Guard and Ministry of the Interior (the ministry responsible for policing, national 
security, and immigration) 
*The total includes 4 arrivals in the Balearic Islands 
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Figure 6. B Irregular immigrants arriving in Spain in small boats (pateras and 
cayucos (1999-2008). Percentages 
  
Strait of Gibraltar 
% 
 
 
Canary Islands 
% 
 
Total 
 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
 
 
75 
84 
78 
41 
51 
46 
60 
19 
31 
32 
 
25 
16 
22 
59 
49 
54 
40 
81 
69 
68 
 
 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Source: Spanish Civil Guard and Ministry of the Interior 
 
 
Because this surveillance was initially focused on the coasts of Cadiz, the original 
routes crossing the straight were diverted toward provinces to the east and west on the 
Andalusian coast (Huelva, Granada and Almeria) and new routes were activated toward 
the Canary Islands, first to the islands of Fuerteventura and Lanzarote and later to Gran 
Canaria and Tenerife. In other words, the increased use of the Canarian route during the 
first few years of this decade was a response to greater surveillance of the Strait of 
Gibraltar and the difficulty of entering through Ceuta and Melilla where fences had 
been gradually been erected around both cities and electronic surveillance implemented. 
SIVE, which currently covers the majority of the coastline of the Canary Islands, the 
Balearic Islands, Ceuta, Melilla and the Spanish Mediterranean, has not only caused 
migration routes to change, but also greatly discouraged using them altogether by 
making it extremely difficult for boats to reach Spanish coasts undetected. This system 
has made it possible to maintain complete surveillance of Spain’s maritime borders.  
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Figure 7. Extension of the Integrated External Surveillance System (SIVE) 
 
2000-2004 
Phase I. Algeciras 
Phase II. Cadiz, Malaga and Fuerteventura 
Phase III. Granada and Ceuta 
2005-2008 
Phase IV. Almeria 
Phase V. Lanzarote 
Phase VI. Gran Canaria, Huelva, 
Phase VII. Tenerife, La Gomera 
Phase VIII. Murcia  
2009  
Valencia, Alicante and Baleares  
 
 
C. Bilateral agreements with African countries 
 
The readmissions programme began working with some regularity after 2004 when the 
1992 agreement was revitalised by improved relations between Morocco and Spain. 
This improvement was largely due to the fact that the Partido Socialista Obrero Español 
(PSOE) won the elections that year and took over the government. Until then Morocco 
had not fulfilled its part of that agreement, claiming that it lacked funds and personnel. 
These problems, along with the difficulty in verifying the countries of origin of the 
immigrants, who in many cases do not carry passports, contained the repatriations and 
readmissions to Morocco. At first Morocco’s cooperation mostly consisted of admitting 
its own citizens via a fast return system, but it was later broadened to include 
immigrants from sub-Saharan countries. The improvement of diplomatic relations 
between Spain and Morocco after mid 2004 greatly increased their cooperation on 
controlling irregular immigration in transit to Spain. For example, joint patrols were 
established to fight against traffic in the Straight of Gibraltar and on the western coast of 
Morocco, and police cooperation was reinforced on various levels; key to the latter was 
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the creation of the permanent Hispano-Moroccan work group on immigration. 
According to reports by the Moroccan government, as of 2004 thousands of agents have 
been assigned to controlling the coast, thousands of human trafficking networks have 
been dismantled and thousands of people have been detained when they tried to leave 
Morocco toward Spain. The Spanish government has presented its successful bilateral 
relations with Morocco –the police and diplomatic cooperation and the establishment of 
the permanent work group – as an example of effective joint management of the fight 
against irregular immigration, particularly in negotiations with other countries, such as 
Senegal. The increased ‘joint’ control in Moroccan territory and along its coasts is 
directly related to the appearance of the new Southern Route and the consolidation of 
Mauritania as the main transit country for irregular immigration in the West African 
Route.  
In 2002 and 2003 Spain signed three new immigration and movement of persons 
agreements with Algiers, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania
8
. These agreements included 
the obligation to readmit citizens of these countries, upon request by the Spanish 
government, that had been detained for being in Spanish territory irregularly or when 
they tried to clandestinely enter Spain. Although these agreements have been difficult to 
apply effectively for many reasons, one of the main administrative obstacles has been 
identifying undocumented immigrants (see Asín, 2008a). Only two of these agreements, 
signed with Morocco and Mauritania, include readmission of third country nationals
9
 
when it can be demonstrated that the migrants arrived in Spain via their territories 
(Vacas Fernández, 2007). In the case of Morocco, other aspects of the agreement have 
made it difficult or impractical to execute, including the requirement for petitions made 
by Spain be presented within 10 days of the illegal entry in its territory. However, in the 
last few years, greater cooperation between the two countries has transformed how these 
agreements are carried out, making it a great deal easier to readmit immigrants to 
                                                            
8 Protocol between the Government of Spain and the Government of the Democratic and Popular 
Republic of Algiers on the movement of persons (B.O.E nº 37 de 12/2/2004); Agreement between the 
Kingdom of Spain and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania on immigration (B.O.E nº 185 de 4/8/2003).  
9 As Asunción Asín pointed out, Fernández Vacas analysed these agreements, distinguishing three very 
different situations: 1) repatriation agreements, in which citizens of a country who are found to be staying 
irregularly in another country are returned to their country; 2) strict readmission agreements, in which a 
country readmits non-citizens that passed through its territory before arriving irregularly in another 
country; and 3) transit agreements, which allow a foreigner to pass through a country in order to reach 
another country, usually the country of origin, after being found to be staying irregularly in another 
country (Asín, 2008a).  
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Morocco. It should also be noted that the agreement with Morocco is the only one that 
regulates transit for the expulsion of third country foreigners.  
 
5. The direction of Spanish immigration policy after the ‘cayuco crisis’ of 2006: 
challenges and results 
Border control initiatives multiplied in Spain after 2005 due to a combination of internal 
and international factors. First of all, there was a concerted push by the common and 
multilateral border policy in the European Union after the Prum Convention (Schengen 
III), the Hague Programme and the 2006 European Commission communications on 
external maritime borders and the fight against irregular immigration. This heralded a 
period of institutional creation and improvement and the channelling of funds which led 
to the appearance of FRONTEX, the creation of the External Borders Fund and the 
Schengen Borders Code; the improvement of the Schengen Information System (SIS), 
the proposal to create the European External Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 
the formation of rapid border intervention teams (RABIT) and the deployment of 
immigration liaison officers. In order to facilitate expulsions, data production and 
identification systems at checkpoints (airports, ports, etc.) have been improved through 
bilateral cooperation between EU countries. These initiatives were completed at the 
beginning of 2008 with the proposal of the ‘border package’, whose ultimate goal is to 
create a European automated and integrated border control system which uses 
technology and databases.  
A. The Africa Plan 
Two factors led Spain to change their flow control policies: the escalation of irregular 
immigration by sea in 2006 and the massive attempts to cross over into Spanish territory 
through Ceuta and Melilla in 2005. Both of these situations put the ‘Spanish case’ in the 
spotlight of the international media for the first time in its brief migratory history. This 
was understandable considering that in 2006 more than 39,000 irregular immigrants 
reached Spain using maritime routes, 32,000 to the Canary Archipelago alone, just over 
1,000 of which were unaccompanied minors. Around 19,000 people were transferred to 
other Spanish regions from the Canaries in 2006, following a political agreement 
between the central government and the autonomous communities to distribute irregular 
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immigrants throughout the country. For the first time Africa became a priority of 
foreign policy, a situation that led to the creation of the Africa Plan, which marks a 
before and after in reorientation of Spain’s policy on controlling flows with  sub-
Saharan African countries. It must be emphasised that this plan tries to provide an 
integrated global response to the migration phenomenon by combining the fight against 
irregular immigration with measures such as contracting foreign workers in their 
countries of origin, applying policies which actively integrate newly arrived immigrants 
into Spanish society and promoting cooperation in development of the countries of 
origin and transit. This attitude toward migration is manifested through bilateral lines of 
action; to be more precise, in the content of the ‘new approach’ immigration 
cooperation agreements signed with Gambia, Guinea Conakry, Cape Verde, Mali and 
Niger
10
 between 2006 and 2008 (Asín, 2008b; Ferrero and López-Sala, 2009). The plan 
includes objectives such as reinforcing border control in countries of origin and transit, 
obtaining information on routes and streamlining immediate repatriation procedures for 
immigrants from these countries. This last objective partly explains Spain’s move 
toward a repatriation policy after 2006, which requires the support of countries of origin 
in order to be effective (see Figure 8). The agreements also include technical assistance 
in the fight against irregular immigration, the organisation of training courses for 
consular and immigration personnel and campaigns to raise awareness of the risks 
involved with irregular immigration. 
Figure 8. Repatriations carried out by Spain (2000-2008) 
  
Returns from 
official 
checkpoints* 
 
Readmissions 
 
Expulsions 
 
Returns from 
other border 
areas 
 
Total 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
6,181 
8,881 
11,698 
14,750 
11,280 
15,258 
19,332 
24,355 
17,317 
9,249 
11,311 
38,993 
51,413 
83,431 
52,017 
48,117 
6,248 
6,178 
1,226 
3,817 
12,159 
14,104 
13,296 
11,002 
11,373 
9,467 
10,616 
22,716 
22,984 
14,275 
13,684 
13,136 
14,466 
21,652 
15,868 
12,315 
39,372 
46,993 
77,125 
93,951 
121,143 
92,743 
100,474 
55,938 
46,426 
Source. Ministry of the Interior. *See note 6 for an explanation of the different kinds of actions.  
                                                            
10 Agreement with Gambia (B.O.E nº 310 de 28 de diciembre de 2006) Guinea (B.O.E nº 26 de 30 de 
marzo de 2007) Cape Verde (B.O. E nº 39, de 14 de febrero de 2008)  Mali (B.O.E nº 35, de 4 de junio de 
2008) and Níger (B.O.E nº 160, de 30 de julio de 2008).  
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Other measures have included increasing Spain’s diplomatic presence in the countries 
of origin and transit, extending the number of agregados de interior
11
 in West African 
countries and the creation of immigration offices and employment offices, like the one 
created in Dakar to contract workers in their country. Although a formal immigration 
agreement does not yet exist with Senegal, one of the main sources of irregular 
immigration by sea, a memorandum of understanding was signed in August 2006 which 
has served to develop actions that have had uneven results, such as contracting workers 
in Senegal and repatriations (Plan África, 2006; López-Sala: 2009b). Spain has also 
funded the development and consolidation of a pioneer project in Africa to create the 
Migration Information and Management Centre (CEGIM), which was launched in 
October 2008 in Mali, as well as the development of workshop schools for young 
people. Bilateral cooperation agreements have also been signed with Senegal and 
Morocco to prevent the irregular immigration of unaccompanied minors.  
 
B. Seahorse Project and Seahorse Network 
In addition to the application of the new readmission agreements, the promotion of 
repatriations, coastal border surveillance through the implementation of SIVE and the 
increased police presence at the borders (from 10,239 to 15,710 police in 2008), there 
has also been increased surveillance on the African coast and other areas of the 
countries of origin and transit that are heavily involved in migrations flows. The work 
of liaison officers and the agregados de interior has been reinforced through bilateral 
and multilateral collaboration in police matters. The best example of this work can be 
seen in Project Seahorse and the Seahorse Network that have been developed by Spain 
within the framework of the AENEAS Project
12
. 
Bilateral police collaboration between Spain and African countries in order to carry out 
joint surveillance and control of irregular immigration along the West African maritime 
route started back in 2004. In July 2004, working within the framework of the Hispano-
Moroccan Permanent Task Force and the Cooperation Agreement between the Royal 
                                                            
11Agregados de interior are representatives of the Ministry of the Interior (usually police) who work in 
Spanish embassies.  
12 The objective of the EU AENEAS Project is to promote cooperation with third countries on 
immigration and asylum.  
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Moroccan Gendarmerie and the Spanish Civil Guard, joint maritime patrols along 
Morocco’s Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts were initiated with excellent results 
according to the reports of the Spanish Civil Guard and the Ministry of the Interior
13
 
(see Gabella, 2005). In 2006 the Atlantis Project was launched; a bilateral joint-
surveillance project with the Mauritanian Gendarmerie developed to control irregular 
immigration in Mauritania’s territorial waters. In 2006, Seahorse, the most complex 
programme, was initiated based on this previous bilateral experience. The objectives of 
Seahorse are to prevent irregular immigration and fight against human trafficking. The 
programme was developed by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior and run by the 
Spanish Civil Guard; with a budget of 2.5 million euros, it includes the participation of 
police from Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde. This programme focuses on 
carrying out joint operations and deploying liaison officers. The most important recent 
development of this programme has been the creation of the Seahorse Network, a 
regional secure network coordinated in Spain to exchange information on irregular 
immigration by sea. The countries that have participated in this network in 2009 are 
Spain, Portugal, Cape Verde, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Gambia and Guinea 
Bissau. This pioneer system allows information to be available in real time via satellite 
in order to locate from where clandestine vessels are launched and to track their 
trajectory. It is a secure information exchange network between Spain and countries of 
origin and transit. To create this network, local contact points have been established in 
African countries which in the future will become coordination centres similar to the 
Canary Islands Regional Coordination Centre. Land operations have also been carried 
out in Senegal (Operation Goreé) and Mauritania (Operation Cabo Blanco) to prevent 
boats from launching from their coasts.  
 
C. The Canary Islands Regional Coordination Centre and FRONTEX 
The Canary Islands Regional Coordination Centre (CCRC), created in 2006
14
 by the 
Spanish government, is a groundbreaking experience in Spain and the EU whose 
purpose is to facilitate the coordination between different national, European and local 
institutions in the fight against irregular immigration by sea. It has various functions: to 
                                                            
13 The Spanish ministry that is responsible for policing, national security, and immigration. 
14 B.O.E nº 243, 11 de octubre de 2006. 
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control irregular immigration to the Canaries, direct joint maritime patrols with 
countries of the region, centralise and distribute any intelligence it receives, coordinate 
naval, police and customs operations and set up marine salvage and rescue operations 
(Arteaga, 2007). To date it has hosted the joint operations of FRONTEX in the area. 
CCRC represents a broad array of Spanish government stakeholders, including the 
army, navy, Ministry of Defence, national intelligence, marine rescue operations, home 
affairs, national police, Civil Guard, Ministry of Economy, regional government of the 
Canary Islands and Ministry of Labour and Immigration and Social Affairs (with a 
hospital vessel deployed in African waters to support Spanish fisherman and assist 
immigrants if in need). New coordination centres are expected to be implemented in the 
next few years in other parts of Spain to coordinate via networks all border control 
tasks. Among these locations will be Algeciras, to monitor the Straight of Gibraltar, and 
another in Valencia, for the Mediterranean coast.  
 
This joint, multilateral surveillance, along with the operations carried out by FRONTEX 
on the Spanish maritime borders (operations Hera, Minerva and Indalo), have increased 
the interceptions in Africa, making it very difficult to use the irregular immigration sea 
routes to Spain
15
. By the end of 2006, just over 4,200 immigrants (11.87% of the total) 
were intercepted on African coasts; while in 2007 this number rose to 8,500 people 
(40.73% of the total) and in 2008 it reached 6,659 (41.84%). The maritime surveillance 
actions in African water and on the Spanish coasts, along with the expulsion policy and 
the economic crisis, explain why the number of arrivals via this route has dropped 
drastically in 2009. In the first half of 2009 only 4,760 people have reached Spain by 
sea, a far cry from the 39,000 that had arrived in 2006. This fall was particularly sharp 
in the case of the Atlantic route to the Canary Islands. However, there has been a slight 
increase, compared to 2008, in arrivals via the Mediterranean.  
 
6. The internal effects of border management: actors and governability 
                                                            
15 Before the FRONTEX operations, some surveillance operations had already been carried out on 
Spanish coasts financed by the Spanish government or the European Union, among them was Operation 
Noble Centinela or the Guanarteme operations.  
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The escalation of this kind of irregular immigration has also affected the relations 
between the central government and some autonomous communities, which have 
acquired a leading role in the management of this policy area. It should be noted that in 
Spain the competences to manage different aspects of immigration are distributed 
between various ministries and between the central government and the autonomous 
communities. That is why at the beginning of this decade two organisations were 
created to coordinate the actions of these different administrations: the Comisión 
Interministerial de Extranjería [Interministerial Commission on Alien Affairs], made 
up of representatives from the different ministries and the Consejo Superior de Política 
de Inmigración [Superior Council on Immigration Policy], which also includes 
representatives of the different Spanish regions and local governments. 
 
The new flows have transformed aspects of the political agenda in the Spanish regions 
that receive them, which have competences in social assistance and integration. The 
difficulty in arriving at agreements and resolving problems stem from the ‘extra load’ 
that the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla and Andalusia have to bear because of their 
geographic locations. Their first concern was to develop measures that could effectively 
meet the medical, educational and social needs of newly arrived immigrants. Second, 
the difficulty in carrying out repatriations and meeting legal guarantees made it 
absolutely necessary to increase the amount of resources dedicated to providing legal 
aid and creating new holding centres for adults and minors. To deal with these concerns 
a ‘formal’ policy was put into place to distribute irregular immigrants among the 
different Spanish provinces as a way to share the burden of dealing with these needs. 
This policy required agreements to be made between different autonomous communities 
whose regional governments were run by different political parties. At the same time, 
policy creation was broadened to include the active involvement of ayuntamientos 
[municipal councils], diputaciones [central government delegations in the provinces] 
and cabildos [island-based councils in the Canary Islands], as well as some NGOs 
which have played an essential role in providing assistance to immigrants and in the 
development of emergency units. The human drama surrounding this kind of irregular 
immigration has had a strong social impact, with misgivings expressed by part of the 
populace as the arrivals have increased. This dramatic situation has activated some local 
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actors to call attention to problems and assist in resolving them, but at the same time it 
has made it highly complex to arrive at decisions on how to act, as delicate balances and 
broad consensus must be sought between public and private actors and between 
different levels of government, each with its own agenda and point of view on how to 
confront this phenomenon.  
The difficult governability of this policy stems from having to count on the cooperation 
of other countries and the need to spend a tremendous amount of resources to 
effectively monitor the borders. It is also exacerbated by tensions that arise when trying 
to include and reconcile the interests and positions of different sectors of public opinion 
and various state institutions and also by the disagreements that emerge between the 
different levels of government that have competences in this area and, as a consequence, 
the need to create new forms of coresponsibility.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Spanish immigration policy emerged in the second half of the 1980s in response to the 
demands of the European Union after it was accepted as a member. At that time there 
was not a lot of immigration and it had not caught the attention of either the political 
class or Spanish society; therefore, its initial approach was closely tied to external 
factors. In other words, originally, the policy was not linked to an orderly regulation of 
labour migration, but rather shaped by decisions taken by the European Union, which 
created certain inconsistencies.  
In the 1990s, accompanied by legislative and institutional development, Spanish policy 
broadened its objectives and incorporated various actions that responded to internal 
factors (mostly economic), although it was still a fragile policy in the early stages of 
development. The Spanish labour migration model was strongly affected by rapid 
economic development and the heavy demand for unskilled workers in construction, 
hotel services, domestic service and intensive agriculture. However, this demand had to 
be reconciled with objectives derived from Spain’s geopolitical transformation into the 
southern border of the European Union. As a result, the actions taken were reactive and 
ambivalent, an approach that allowed migrants to enter Spain through the ‘back door’ 
and then to be legalised after the fact. Therefore, the border control and remote control 
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policies of the 1990s can be characterized as weak. This weak border control, along 
with regularisations and the quota system, was met with a certain amount of reticence in 
other EU member states. In this sense, Spain’s ‘irregular immigration model’, in which 
it was habitual for immigrants to hold irregular status at some point during their 
migration, resulted from the government’s political action, or inaction, as the case may 
be. However, mechanisms were created during this period, such as regularisation, which 
allowed immigrants to avoid being trapped in a permanent state of irregularity. In 
addition, being irregular did not lead to severe civic exclusion among the migrants, 
because basic rights such as education and emergency health care were recognised, and 
this kept social conflict and xenophobic reactions among the population to a minimum. 
Furthermore, during this period internal control was very weak, with very few actions 
carried out to search for irregular immigrants living in Spanish territory. Finally, 
Spanish immigration policy in the 1990s was also characterised by selective 
enforcement; that is, maritime borders were strictly controlled, which had a heavier 
impact on flows coming from Africa, but land and air borders were less tightly 
maintained, making it relatively easy for immigrants from other parts of the world, 
particularly Latin America, to enter the territory.  
In the current decade Spanish immigration policy has been more concrete due to the fact 
that immigration has become a priority for foreign policy and national security. 
Therefore, in recent years it has been improved, becoming somewhat less reactive and 
more complex, and in general terms more in line with the objective of maintaining an 
orderly labour immigration. In addition, while throughout the 1990s the European 
Union set the Spanish agenda on border control, over the past few years Spain has 
acquired much greater protagonism in the development of European initiatives. Its 
influence has been felt both in the emphasis placed on cooperating with countries of 
origin and transit, as well as its defence of border control as a ‘joint issue’ which 
requires new approaches based on cooperation and distribution of resources and 
responsibilities. 
However, Spanish immigration and border control policy has also been difficult to 
manage and these governability problems stem from a combination of factors: first of 
all, its geographic location and its condition as the southern border of the European 
Union; second, the institutional balancing act that must be carried out between the 
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different levels of government due to the structure of the Spanish political system; and 
third, the high visibility of actions taken both internally and internationally. It is a 
situation that clearly illustrates the contradictions that arise between a state’s sovereign 
right to decide who enters its territory and maintain national security and the protection 
of universal human rights. As of 2006 the policy on controlling migratory flows has 
become more proactive and effective, with growing emphasis placed on controlling the 
flows in transit and internally. Working the active cooperation of countries of origin and 
transit has been a huge part of the success of this policy.  
8. Key lessons from the Spanish experience and good practices  
 Political and institutional development 
 Inter-institutional coordination to increase effectiveness and the 
‘operationalisation’ of intervention 
In order to develop Spanish immigration policy new legislation was created, plans were 
prepared, institutions were created or adapted and this material was incorporated into a 
great deal of public policy as a transversal issue. The distribution of competences 
among the central government’s eleven ministries, and between the central 
administration and the regional governments in Spain’s decentralised public system, has 
led to the creation of different organisations to coordinate the different institutions, such 
as the Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración and the Comisión Interministerial 
de Extranjería. The creation of advisory bodies, such as the Foro para la Integración 
Social, has created a situation where policies can be created by consensus. The 
promotion of coordination between ministries and between agencies can be considered a 
necessary experience for the effective development and execution of this policy area. 
Concentrating the competences in controlling migratory flows in the hands of the 
Ministry of the Interior and separating actions between the Spanish Civil Guard 
(external borders and surveillance) and the national police (internal control, 
identification, repatriations, holding centres, the fight against the facilitated irregular 
immigration and falsified documents) have also improved effectiveness.  
This coordination has been extended to the design and production of information. A 
good example of this is the recently created CICO (a centre dedicated to gathering 
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intelligence against organised crime) which will gather information from various 
agencies in the fight against facilitated irregular immigration. This collaboration in the 
production and analysis of information has allowed for greater policy innovation and 
better diagnostics. There are currently various proposals to improve the system which 
registers information on irregular immigration.  
 Apply appropriate strategies and responses to the specific situations of 
individual countries.  
 Create policy which responds to the specific situation of each country  
 Establish geographical priorities 
 
Despite the influence of the European Union in the development of Spanish 
immigration policy, its economic needs and geographic location ended up having a 
greater impact on how it shaped its response to this phenomenon, as it gave internal 
factors priority. Spain’s approach to regulating migratory flows has attempted to 
reconcile the specific demands of the Spanish labour market with the country’s 
condition as the southern border of Europe. Spain’s recent success in this area is due to 
the fact that it adapted its policy to deal with its specific situation, including tailoring its 
actions to control a maritime border (as opposed to a land border).  This approach has 
also led Spain to develop policies that place priority on certain geographic regions, all in 
Africa, which are not priorities for other EU member states. In this sense, Spain has 
shown a great ability to create innovative political responses and agreements.  
 Controlling migratory flows must be part of a global immigration policy that 
also incorporates recruiting workers in their countries of origin and integrating 
them into society. 
 Reactive policies must be replaced by proactive policies. 
 
An effective policy on controlling migratory flows must include both the development 
of programmes that actively recruit foreign workers in their country of origin and 
programmes that cooperate in development of their countries. Initiatives to recruit 
workers in their country of origin were developed by Spain in 2000 and reactivated in 
2004. These initiatives have made it possible to create flexible programmes that adapt to 
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the needs of the economy, while creating legal ways for migrants to enter the country 
which will put an end to the ‘irregular immigration model’. These initiatives represent a 
new approach which seeks to balance the actions in different areas of immigration 
policy by designing common goals. In general terms, Spanish policy has migrated from 
reactive actions to proactive measures.  
 
 Bilateralism and cooperation with the countries of origin and transit: the keys to 
successfully controlling migration on the maritime border 
 Partnership and added value through exchange of information between origin, 
transit and destination countries  
Bilateral cooperation with the countries of origin and transit of irregular immigration to 
Spain via the Atlantic and Mediterranean routes has been key to the recent success of 
the control and fight against irregular immigration. Earlier experience in bilateral 
collaboration and partnership between the Spanish Civil Guard and the Moroccan and 
Mauritanian police through joint patrols and the Atlantis Operation, shaped the good 
practices applied to the new cooperation agreements with Senegal and led to the 
development of the Seahorse programme and the Seahorse network. The effectiveness 
of the action has depended on the development of joint operations and the creation of a 
secure information exchange network. These measures have increased detentions in 
countries of origin and transit.  
The bilateral agreements that Spain signed with African countries between 2006 and 
2008 have made it possible to develop an effective repatriation policy. In return for 
signing these agreements, Spain has begun instituting measures in transit countries such 
as hiring workers from their countries, as well as offering them technical assistance and 
special training programmes. In addition, pilot programmes have been initiated in the 
countries of origin to provide professional training to young people and other 
programmes to support immigrants who wish to return to their countries to invest in 
their home economies (for example if they wish to open a business, the Spanish 
government will not only pay for their ticket home, but also give them some seed 
money for their project). Repatriations and increased detentions in transit and in 
31 
 
countries of origin through surveillance of the African coast have proven to be two of 
the most effective mechanisms in the fight against irregular immigration. Finally, it 
should also be noted that the profound economic and employment crisis in Spain has 
also contributed to the decrease of migratory flows to its territory. 
 Find innovative ways to control flows and actively participate in the initiatives 
developed by the European Union 
 
Increased border surveillance through technological and operational innovation has 
been particularly effective (achieved by implementing SIVE on the coasts). Another 
innovation was the creation of centres to coordinate border control, such as the Canary 
Islands Regional Coordination Centre, which has coordinated the action of all national 
and international bodies involved in the application and management of policies to 
control migratory flows and in assisting and protecting irregular immigrants. The 
success of this centre has encouraged the creation of similar centres in other strategic 
points in Spain (Madrid, Algeciras, Valencia) as well as in countries of origin.  
 
Bilateral and national action has been coupled with broad Spanish participation in the 
actions carried out by FONTEX and in the development of EUROSUR. 
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